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Extraterritorial Application of The Alien 
Tort Statute After Kiobel 
Ranon Altman* 
This article explores when corporations can be held liable under 
the Alien Tort Statute for human rights abuses that are 
committed outside of the United States. The Alien Tort Statute 
grants the United States district courts jurisdiction for torts 
committed against foreigners in violation of the law of nations. 
While the Alien Tort Statute concerns international law, it does 
not indicate whether the district courts have jurisdiction over 
disputes that involve conduct outside of the United States. 
In this article, I focus my analysis on the Supreme Court’s 2013 
decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. That case 
determined that the Alien Tort Statute only applies to “relevant 
conduct” in the United States. In so deciding, the Court evoked a 
statutory rule of interpretation called the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, which dictates that unless a federal statute 
indicates otherwise, it is to only be applied in the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States. 
This article addresses questions that arise from the application 
of the presumption against extraterritoriality to the Alien Tort 
Statute. For example, do federal courts have jurisdiction over 
claims in which conduct that does not constitute “relevant 
conduct” under the ATS takes place in the United States, but the 
international law violation (the “relevant conduct”) takes place 
in a foreign country? Additionally, to what extent does it matter 
for purposes of ATS jurisdiction that a defendant is a United 
States corporation? 
                                                                                                             
 *  Articles and Comments Editor, University of Miami Business Law Review; Juris 
Doctor Candidate 2016, University of Miami School of Law. I would like to thank 
Professor Stephen J. Schnably for helping me craft this note. 
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In the final portion of this Article, I propose alternative ways to 
apply the presumption against extraterritoriality to the Alien 
Tort Statute. I base this analysis on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank. 
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 113 
II. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE ............................................................ 115 
A. Congress’ Purpose in Enacting the ATS .................................. 117 
B. Causes of Action Under the ATS .............................................. 118 
III. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY .................. 120 
A. Applying the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality to the 
ATS ........................................................................................... 122 
IV. THE KIOBEL TEST AND A CRITIQUE OF ITS APPLICATION IN THE 
LOWER COURTS ............................................................................. 124 
A. Relationship Between the Two Kiobel Clauses ........................ 127 
1. When to Proceed ................................................................ 127 
2. Conflation of the Clauses ................................................... 128 
B. Kiobel Part One: “Relevant Conduct” .................................... 129 
1. Restrictive Reading of “Relevant Conduct” ...................... 129 
2. Overactive Presumption Against Extraterritoriality ........... 131 
C. Kiobel Part Two: Displacing the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality..................................................................... 132 
1. Meaning of “Touch and Concern the Territory of the 
United States” .................................................................... 132 
2. Corporate Citizenship Insufficient to Displace the 
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality ............................. 134 
D. Irreconcilable Application of the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality..................................................................... 136 
V. RETHINKING KIOBEL ...................................................................... 138 
A. The Morrison “Focus” Test .................................................... 138 
B. Morrison Meets Kiobel ............................................................ 139 
C. The “Focus” of the ATS ........................................................... 141 
1. Congressional Motivation .................................................. 141 
2. Focus of the Focus ............................................................. 141 
3. The Most Sensible “Focus” to Apply ................................. 144 
VI. CONCLUSION.................................................................................. 145 
 
2015] ALIEN TORT STATUTE 113 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past 35 years, following the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,1 victims of human rights abuse have invoked the 
federal Alien Tort Statute (ATS)2 to seek redress for violations of 
international law. The ATS provides that “[t]he district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or of a treaty of the United 
States.”3 It was enacted by the First Congress in 1789.4   
Human rights litigation under the ATS flourished after Filartiga.5 
Early post-Filartiga ATS cases involved wrongs committed by state 
officials or quasi-state actors.6 But ATS litigation soon expanded to 
cover wrongs committed abroad by multinational corporations 
(“MNCs”). Major multinational corporations, including Unocal, Royal 
Dutch Petroleum, Pfizer, Del Monte, ExxonMobil, and others, found 
themselves subject to ATS suits for violating human rights in foreign 
countries.7 Corporate defendants were accused of aiding and abetting 
states that arbitrarily detained and tortured aliens, practiced child 
slavery,8 committed genocide,9 or engaged in human experimentation 
without consent.10 For example, in Abdullahi, plaintiffs alleged that 
Pfizer tested experimental antibiotics on Nigerian children without their 
knowledge.11 
                                                                                                             
1 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). 
2 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
3 Id. 
4 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. 
5 See, e.g, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Forti v. 
Suarez-Mason, 627 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d 
Cir. 1995); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999). 
6 See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (suit 
against nine United States executive officials, including the former President Ronald 
Reagan); Forti, 644 F. Supp. at 708 (suit against Argentinian general); Abebe-Jira v. 
Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 846 (11th Cir. 1996) (suit against former Ethiopian government 
official). 
7 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 
2009); Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005); 
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 69 F. Supp. 3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see generally Alan O. 
Sykes, Corporate Liability for Extraterritorial Torts Under the Alien Tort Statute and 
Beyond: An Economic Analysis, 100 GEO L.J. 2161 (2012); see generally Douglas M. 
Branson, Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable? Achilles’ Heels in Alien Tort 
Claims Act Litigation, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 227 (2011). 
8 Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014). 
9 Doe, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 75. 
10 Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 103. 
11 Id. 
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Recent years, however, have seen two major developments that 
threaten to make corporate liability under the ATS a thing of the past. 
The first concerns whether corporations can have tort liability under 
international law.  In 2010, the Second Circuit held that they cannot—
precluding suits against corporations under the ATS.12 The court 
reasoned that corporate liability for international law violations is not a 
common feature among the nations.13 The Second Circuit also warned 
that because corporations are “often engines of their national 
economies,” “rendering their assets into compensatory damages, punitive 
damages, and . . . legal fees” would provoke international conflict.14 The 
Ninth Circuit rejected this view. That court explained that because many 
treaties hold corporations liable for their torts, “it would create a bizarre 
anomaly to immunize corporations from liability for the conduct of their 
agents in lawsuits brought for ‘shockingly egregious violations of 
universally recognized principles of international law.’”15 Other circuits 
have also rejected the Second Circuit’s holding.16 
The Supreme Court was poised to resolve this split in Kiobel, having 
granted certiorari on it.17 Ultimately, however, the Court resolved the 
case on a different ground18—one that has created a second barrier to 
corporate liability under the ATS. In Kiobel, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the ATS is subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality.19 
Under this presumption, a federal statute only applies within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, unless the statute indicates 
otherwise.20 The presumption can be overcome, the Court held, only 
through a test that considers the location of defendants’ conduct and the 
force with which plaintiffs’ claims touch and concern the territory of the 
United States.21 Thus, for now, most lower courts accept the possibility 
of corporate liability under the ATS, but all are bound by the Supreme 
                                                                                                             
12 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 120. 
13 Id. at 143. 
14 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2011) (Jacobs, 
C.J., concurring). 
15 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
16 Sykes, supra note 7, at 2162-63 (“The second circuit . . . concluded that corporations 
cannot be held liable under the ATS, although the Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. 
Circuits disagree.”). 
17 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 
(2011) (No. 10-1491). 
18 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2012); Roxanna 
Altholz, Chronicle of a Death Foretold: The Future of U.S. Human Rights Litigation 
Post-Kiobel, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1495, 1521 (2014) (explaining that after Kiobel it is still 
unclear what courts may hear cases against U.S. corporate defendants). 
19 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
20 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
21 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
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Court’s determination that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
applies to the ATS. 
Since 2013, lower courts have been left with the difficult task of 
interpreting the controlling language in the Court’s opinion. How broadly 
or narrowly Kiobel is interpreted has major implications on corporate 
liability under the ATS. If corporations cannot be liable under the ATS, 
the United States may be silently communicating to the world that 
corporations may operate at the expense of foreign nationals.22 
This article describes and analyzes the application of the Kiobel test 
in the lower courts. In the first section of this article, I provide 
information on the building blocks of my argument—the Alien Tort 
Statute, the Presumption against Extraterritoriality, and the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. In the 
following section, I analyze the Kiobel test and its application in the 
lower courts. I then address whether the test properly administers the 
presumption against extraterritoriality as it should apply in the context of 
the ATS. Finally, I propose an application of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality to the ATS that adopts the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank. 
II. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
In 1789, the first Congress enacted the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) in 
order to create a mechanism by which the United States could enforce 
the law of nations.23 The ATS dictates that “[t]he district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”24 For almost 200 years after its enactment, the ATS lay 
dormant—invoked twice in the 18th century, and only once more in the 
next 167 years.25 With the Second Circuit’s decision in Filartiga v. 
Pena-Irala, the ATS was finally revived after much rest.26 In Filartiga, 
                                                                                                             
22 See Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 619 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Piracy and its 
modern-day equivalents, including torture and genocide, are of particular concern to the 
sovereign . . . because failure to [take action] . . . might render the sovereign ‘an 
accomplice or abetter of [its] subject’s crime, and draw[] upon [its] community the 
calamities of foreign war.’”) (citing 4 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England 68 (1769)). 
23 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877 (2d Cir. 1980). 
24 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
25 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 18 (2011). 
26 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004); Eugene Kontrovich, Kiobel 
Surprise: Unexpected By Scholars But Consistent with International Trends, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV 1671, 1674 (2014) (explaining that modern ATS litigation began with 
Filartiga). 
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the Court upheld application of the ATS for two Paraguayan plaintiffs.27 
They claimed that the defendant, a Paraguayan police inspector, 
kidnapped and tortured their family member in Paraguay.28 In coming to 
his conclusion, Judge Kaufman explained that the law of nations is a part 
of federal common law, and as such, torture committed against an alien, 
a violation of the law of nations, falls within the court’s ATS 
jurisdiction.29 Filartiga marked the ATS’s entrance into “the modern 
internationalized human rights movement that began after World War II 
and flourished in the 1970’s.”30 The opinion introduced a new way for 
the victims of human rights abuse to seek redress in federal court.31 
Multinational corporations did not look favorably on this expansion 
of ATS litigation for obvious reasons.32 Nor did many commentators. 
One called the expansion of ATS litigation to cover multinational 
corporations an “awakening monster”—posing a “nightmare scenario” 
that could have a “chilling impact” on foreign trade and investment and 
interfere with United States foreign relations.33 
In 1984—just four years after Filartiga—Judge Robert Bork’s 
concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic34 casted doubt 
on the continuing viability of ATS actions against corporations. He 
argued that because human rights law was unknown in 1789, the ATS 
could not grant jurisdiction for claims alleging violations of 
contemporary human rights norms.35 Other courts rejected this narrow 
                                                                                                             
27 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890. 
28 Id. at 878. 
29 Id. at 878, 885. 
30 Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1467, 1474 (2014). 
31 See Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A 
Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461 (1989). 
32 Ernest A. Young, Universal Jurisdiction, The Alien Tort Statute, and Transnational 
Public-Law Litigation After Kiobel, 64 DUKE L.J. 1023, 1054 (2015) (“By implicating 
large multinational corporations with substantial litigation budgets, the second wave of 
ATS litigation pulled in sophisticated defense counsel.”). 
33 GARY HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE ALIEN 
TORT STATUTE OF 1789 (Inst. for Int’l Econ. ed., 2003); see also Stephens, supra note 30, 
at 1474 (remarking that some commentators warned that recognizing corporate liability 
within the ATS would have a devastating impact). 
34 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., 
concurring). 
35 For commentary see Bradford R. Clark, Tel-Oren, Filartiga, and the Meaning of the 
Alien Tort Statute, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 177, 190 (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Sosa and Kiobel has more in common with Bork’s concurrence than it 
does with Filartiga); but see Julian Ku, John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: 
A Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 161 (2004) 
(recognizing that commentators have argued that suits alleging violations of customary 
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construction,36 and Congress subsequently re-affirmed the availability of 
the federal courts to hear claims of human rights violations abroad with 
the enactment of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991.37 In 2004, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the ATS does provide jurisdiction for 
violations of human rights norms that are “specific, universal, and 
obligatory.”38 
A. Congress’ Purpose in Enacting the ATS 
The first Congress’ motivation behind enacting the ATS can never 
be precisely known.39 Theories, however, share in common the idea that 
the statute was a “part of the protective armor designed to shield a young 
and vulnerable nation in a dangerous and unpredictable world.”40 But in 
other respects, there is sharp division. One belief is that states within the 
United States did not sufficiently appreciate the international 
consequences that could arise from torts committed against aliens, such 
as ambassadors, within United States territory.41 If left unattended, such 
torts could threaten the United States’ standing with other nations,42 and 
ultimately lead to war.43 Through this interpretation, Congress gave the 
federal courts jurisdiction over international law wrongs committed in 
the United States against foreigners as a protective measure. This was to 
                                                                                                             
international law do not require a separate cause of action, because the First Congress 
assumed that these violations could be brought under the general common law). 
36 See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that 
the Filartiga is more in line with principles of international law than Bork’s approach in 
Tel-Oren); see also Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 180 (D. Mass. 1995) (noting 
that Bork’s view is more restrictive than the plain language of the ATS). 
37 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) 
(provides an independent cause of action for individuals in cases of torture or 
extrajudicial killings); see Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1708 (holding 
that only natural persons can be liable under the TVPA, which is not necessarily true of 
the ATS). 
38 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 748 (2004). 
39 See Burley, supra note 31, at 463. 
40 Id. at 464. 
41 Id. at 465; Stephens, supra note 30, at 1471 (“Prior to the adoption of the 
Constitution, the leaders of the Confederation’s weak central government repeatedly 
expressed concern about their inability to enforce international obligations.”). 
42 See Burley, supra note 31, at 465. 
43 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715; Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (“There is evidence . . . that the intent of [the ATS] was to assure aliens access to 
federal courts to vindicate any incident which, if mishandled by a state court, might 
blossom into an international crisis.”); see Brief for Professors of International Law, 
Foreign Relations Law and Federal Jurisdiction as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., (No. 10-11491), 2012 WL 3276505, 
at *10. 
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be accomplished by giving the federal judiciary “cognizance of all causes 
in which the citizens of countries are concerned.”44 
A different view has much broader implications. By this view, the 
First Congress believed that addressing torts committed against 
foreigners was essential in order for the United States to become a fully 
functioning member of the international community.45 In other words, it 
was the United States’ international duty to entertain suits alleging 
offenses against citizens of other nations.46 Indeed, under this approach, 
the United States could only become a nation among nations if it 
complied with the laws governing other sovereigns.47 
B. Causes of Action Under the ATS 
In Sosa, Justice Souter held that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute48 
that does not grant judges the power to “mold substantive law.”49 He 
further found that the drafters of the ATS recognized a modest number of 
international law violations as claims under federal law, over which the 
ATS was to provide jurisdiction.50 In 1789 these claims included 
violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and 
piracy.51 Justice Souter reasoned that historical materials suggest that the 
statute was not a stillborn and was meant to have practical effect as soon 
as it came into existence.52 
Justice Souter also decided that the ATS is not limited to claims that 
would have been recognized as international law violations in 1789. He 
held that a court is able to recognize a new cause of action under the 
ATS, if that violation “rest[s] on a norm of international character 
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity 
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have 
recognized.”53 International violations are actionable under the ATS if 
                                                                                                             
44 Burley, supra note 31, at 465. 
45 Id. at 484. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713 (holding that ATS is a jurisdictional state because it was 
placed in §  9 of the Judiciary Act, which was concerned with federal-court jurisdiction); 
but see Eugene Kontrovich, Kiobel Surprise: Unexpected By Scholars But Consistent 
with International Trends, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV 1671, 1687 (2014) (“But the ATS as 
explicated in Sosa is not a garden-variety jurisdictional statute; rather, it is at once both 
jurisdictional and substantive in that it authorizes the creation of federal common law.”). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 720. 
51 See id. at 724. 
52 See id. at 714; id. at 719 (“The anxieties of the preconstitutional period cannot be 
ignored easily enough to think that the statute was not meant to have practical effect.”). 
53 Id. at 725. 
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they “affect the relationship between states or between an individual and 
a foreign state . . . .”54 The courts may look to a variety of sources55 to 
determine which violations of the law of nations are sufficiently specific, 
universal, and obligatory to satisfy the Sosa requirements for adopting an 
ATS cause of action.56 
Sosa itself held that a claim for “arbitrary detention” is too vague to 
be actionable.57 In that case, a federal grand jury indicted Alvarez, a 
Mexican national, for the torture and murder of a DEA agent in 
Mexico.58 The United States issued a warrant for his arrest, but the 
Mexican Government refused to cooperate.59 In response, the DEA 
abducted and transported Alvarez to the United States.60 Alvarez brought 
suit under the ATS against the DEA for arbitrarily detaining him.61 The 
Court held that arbitrary detention was not a clear and universally 
recognized international law violation required for ATS jurisdiction.62 
Since then, lower courts have found claims for crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, genocide, torture, extrajudicial killings, forced 
disappearances of persons, and slavery,63 to meet Sosa’s test. Other 
courts have found claims for detention of a foreign national without 
being informed of availability of consular notification and access,64 cross 
border parental-child abduction,65 use of poisoned weapons,66 
terrorism67, “the right to life,”68 and “the right to health,”69 to not meet 
Sosa’s test. 
                                                                                                             
54 Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 181 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Murder of one private 
party by another, universally proscribed by domestic law of all countries . . . is not 
actionable under the AT[S] . . . because the nations of the world have not demonstrated 
that this wrong is of mutual, and not merely several, concern.”). 
55 Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 316 (D. Mass. 2013) 
(finding that treaties, judicial decisions, and controlling legislative content of 
international law can be consulted in finding international law violations that furnish ATS 
jurisdiction). 
56 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. 
57 See id. at 738. 
58 Id. at 697. 
59 Id. at 697-98. 
60 Id. at 698. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 738. 
63 Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014). 
64 Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 208 (2d Cir. 2008). 
65 Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767, 781 (6th Cir. 2007). 
66 Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chemical Co., 517 F.3d 104, 
119 (2d Cir. 2008). 
67 In re Chiquita Brands Intern., Inc. Alien Tort Statute and S’holder Derivative Litig., 
792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
68 Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 160 (2d Cir. 2003). 
69 Id. 
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Significantly, the lower courts have found that aiding and abetting 
liability satisfy Sosa’s requirement of definiteness and acceptance.70 The 
recognition of aiding and abetting liability under the ATS has been 
paramount for human rights plaintiffs looking to hold MNCs liable for 
violations of international law. Corporations are often indirect 
contributors to alleged ATS violations.71 In Doe, for example, Nestle 
USA was accused of providing assistance to Ivorian famers who used 
child slaves.72 To establish aiding and abetting liability, many federal 
circuits require a showing that the defendant provided assistance to the 
principal “with the purpose of facilitating the commission of that 
crime.”73 Plaintiffs attempting to hold MNCs liable for their conduct 
have often failed on this ground.74 
III. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
Whenever Congress enacts law, it is presumed that the law only 
governs within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.75 Courts 
may, however, infer from a federal statute’s text that the law’s coverage 
extends beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.76 This 
                                                                                                             
70 E.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007); Doe 
v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1078 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Romero v. Drummond Co., 
Inc., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008); Aziz v. Alcodac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 390 (4th 
Cir. 2011). 
71 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013) (alleged 
that Royal Dutch Petroleum enlisted help of Nigerian Government to violently suppress 
protesting citizens); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 59 F. Supp. 3d 75, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(alleged that Exxon Mobil, who hired Indonesian soldiers to guard a natural gas field, 
injured and killed plaintiffs). 
72 Doe, 748 F. Supp. at 1064. 
73 In re Chiquita Brands Intern., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1343 (emphasis added) 
(holding that in order to plead aiding and abetting liability, plaintiff must establish that 
defendant acted with the purpose or intent to assist in the violation); Aziz, 658 F.3d at 401 
(holding that a purposeful mens rea is required for aiding and abetting liability); contra 
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that mere 
knowledge will suffice for the mens rea of an aider and abettor); see Cabello v. 
Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1161 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that plaintiffs had to 
establish a knowledge mens). 
74 See, e.g., Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 192 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that 
there is no support that Chevron intended to aid and abet violations of the Saddam 
Hussein regime); see also Aziz, 658 F.3d at 401 (holding that conclusory allegations that 
defendant corporation purposefully placed Kromfax into commerce to manufacture 
chemical weapons is insufficient to meet the aiding and abetting mens rea requirement). 
75 E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
76 See Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (finding that 
whether the presumption applies is a question of congressional intent). 
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rule of statutory interpretation serves to prevent “unintended clashes 
between our laws and those of other nations.”77 
In 1909, the Supreme Court delivered American Banana Co. v. 
United Fruit Co., its seminal case on the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, before it was known as such.78 United Fruit Co., a 
New Jersey corporate defendant, monopolized banana trade by buying its 
competitors’ businesses.79 American Banana Co., the plaintiff, owned a 
banana plantation in Panama.80 During that time, Panama gave the Costa 
Rican government control over the area where plaintiff operated its 
banana plantation.81 Plaintiff alleged that United Fruit Co. induced Costa 
Rican soldiers to seize plaintiff’s banana plantation,82 after which, 
plaintiff then brought suit in federal court under the Sherman Act to 
prevent defendant from participating in the banana market.83 The Court 
ultimately declined to find jurisdiction under the Sherman Act because 
the conduct at issue took place outside of the United States.84 It declared 
that “in case of doubt [a statute should be] confined in its operation and 
effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and 
legitimate power. All legislation is prima facie territorial.”85 Thus, the 
Court ruled that the Sherman Act did not apply extraterritoriality.86 
Throughout the years, courts have applied the presumption against 
extraterritoriality to dismiss claims where conduct took place outside of 
the United States. In Morrison,87 plaintiffs brought suit against National 
Australia Bank for allegedly committing securities fraud in violation of 
section 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.88 The Court 
never proceeded to the merits of plaintiffs’ securities fraud claim.89 
Rather, it ruled that the presumption against extraterritoriality applied to 
section 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act because nothing in the 
text of 10b-5 indicated that the statute should have extraterritorial 
application.90 Because the securities in question were traded exclusively 
                                                                                                             
77 Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248. 
78 Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 




83 Id. at 357. 
84 Id. at 355. 
85 Id. at 357 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
86 Id. 
87 See infra pp. 137-38. 
88 Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 250-51 (2010). 
89 Id. at 273. 
90 Id. at 262. 
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on the Australian Stock Exchange, and on other foreign exchanges, the 
Court found that the presumption barred plaintiffs’ suit.91 
Similarly, the Foley Bros court held that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality applied to the Eight Hour Law,92 which dictated that 
workers with longer than eight hour shifts were entitled to a payment of 
not less than one-half times the standard pay rate.93 In Foley Bros, 
defendants contracted to construct public works for the United States in 
Iraq and Iran.94 Plaintiffs, who were laborers under the contract, worked 
more than eight hour days without overtime compensation.95 
Nonetheless, the Court held that because no language in the Eight Hour 
Law suggested that Congress intended for the law to apply 
extraterritorially, the Court could not hear a claim for violations that took 
place in Iraq and Iran.96 
A. Applying the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality to the 
ATS 
The presumption against extraterritoriality is intended to prevent 
“unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations.” 97 
Indeed, the legislative and executive branches are thought to be better 
equipped to handle sensitive questions of international law.98 These 
concerns are of particular importance in regards to the ATS, under which 
courts can craft private causes of actions based on international law 
violations that carry unknown foreign policy consequences.99 When 
conduct occurs in the territory of a foreign sovereign, as it often does 
under the ATS, foreign policy concerns are magnified.100 However, ATS 
claims that reach a foreign territory do not always implicate the same 
                                                                                                             
91 Id. at 273. 
92 See Foley Bros v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). 
93 Id. at 283. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 285. 
97 E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
98 John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 
351, 386 (2010). 
99 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004). 
100 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665 (2013); Amicus US 6 
(“Modern litigation under the ATS has focused primarily on alleged law of nation 
violations committed within foreign countries.”). 
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presumption.101 For example, many cases will involve sovereigns that are 
either silently or openly in favor of the litigation.102 
While the recognition of certain international law violations may 
create foreign policy consequences, failing to address those international 
law violations can create similar consequences.103 That is particularly so 
when the international law violations are committed by United States 
citizens. In such cases, the application of the presumption can create the 
very international consequences the presumption seeks to avoid.104 If the 
United States makes its courts unavailable for claims against its citizens, 
for actions taken within a foreign country, the United States may be 
sending the other nations a message of its acquiescence in the alleged 
violations.105 
In Kiobel, the Court held that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality applies to the ATS because Congress gave no 
indication that it intended for the statute to have extraterritorial reach.106 
Justice Breyer, on the other hand, felt the presumption should not apply 
to the ATS.107 He explained that “the ATS . . . was enacted with ‘foreign 
matters’ in mind.”108 In support of his position, Breyer noted the statute’s 
reference to “‘alien[s],’ ‘treat[ies],’ and ‘the law of nations,’”109 and 
further argued that he ATS’ purpose is to remedy violations of the law of 
nations that could otherwise lead to international consequences.110 
The ATS concerns international law. The United States is formally 
committed to the application of international law, while recognizing that 
human rights violations are not purely domestic concerns of any 
                                                                                                             
101 Stephens, supra note 30, at 1540. 
102 Id.; see, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 
1472 (9th Cir. 1994) (“This is evidenced by the Philippine government’s agreement that 
that the suit against Marcos proceed.”). 
103 See Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 323 (D. Mass. 2013) 
(“Under the law of nations, states are obliged to make civil courts of justice accessible for 
claims of foreign subjects against individuals within that state’s territory. ‘If the court’s 
decision constitutes a denial of justice, or if it appears to condone the original wrongful 
act, under the law of nations the United States would become responsible’”) (citing Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
concurring)); see also Anthony J. Colangelo, A United Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 
VA. L. REV. 1019, 1024 (2011) (“[T]he presumption . . . may achieve precisely what it 
was designed to avoid: discord with foreign nations.”). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
107 Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
108 Id. at 1672. 
109 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §  1350 (2012)). 
110 Id. 
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sovereign state.111 One aspect of international human rights law is the 
concept of universal jurisdiction.112 The Restatement of Foreign 
Relations Law provides that a State should have jurisdiction to punish 
certain international law violations even if the State lacks any territorial 
connection to the alleged offense or has any nationality links with the 
offender.113 Piracy, genocide, and war crimes are a few offenses that fall 
under this definition.114 Even though these violations are also actionable 
under the ATS, Kiobel ruled that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality applies to the statute.115 As a result, the ATS does not 
grant jurisdiction on claims that are otherwise actionable under the 
principle of universal jurisdiction. 
IV. THE KIOBEL TEST AND A CRITIQUE OF ITS APPLICATION IN 
THE LOWER COURTS 
In 2013, the Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 
decided that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to ATS 
claims.116 Kiobel involved Nigerian nationals, residing in the United 
States, who filed suit against Dutch, British, and Nigerian 
corporations.117 The plaintiffs alleged that the corporations aided and 
abetted the Nigerian Government in committing violations of the law of 
nations in Nigeria.118 Specifically, plaintiffs accused Royal Dutch 
Petroleum of enlisting the Nigerian Government to “violently suppress” 
citizens who protested the environmental effects of Royal Dutch 
Petroleum’s oil exploration in Nigeria.119 Chief Justice Roberts, writing 
for the majority, held, on the facts of the case, that “all the relevant 
conduct took place outside the United States.”120 He further declared 
that, “even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the 
United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the 
                                                                                                             
111 See U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Human Rights, (Nov. 11 2015), 
www.state.gov/j/drl/hr (“The United States seeks to [h]old governments accountable to 
their obligations under universal international human rights norms and international 
human rights instruments.”). 
112 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION TO 
DEFINE AND PUNISH CERTAIN OFFENSES §  404 (1987). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
116 Id.  
117 Id. at 1662. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 1669. 
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presumption against extraterritorial application.”121 Roberts added that 
“[c]orporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach 
too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices.”122 
Kiobel sets forth two inquiries to determine whether the presumption 
against extraterritoriality bars an ATS claim: (1) does all of the relevant 
conduct take place outside of the United States? 123 and (2) does the 
claim touch and concern the territory of the United States with sufficient 
force to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality? 124 These 
inquiries do not provide lower courts with an adequate framework for 
resolving complicated fact scenarios that often arise under the ATS.125 
Consider the following hypotheticals. In each fact pattern, a coal 
mining company (“mining company”) hires a criminal organization 
(“organization”) to torture a coal mining labor union member (“union 
member”). The union member thereafter brings an ATS action against 
the company. The first hypothetical will show difficulties in applying the 
first part of the Kiobel inquiry. The second hypothetical will show 
difficulties in applying the second. 
In the first hypothetical, the mining company, the organization, and 
the union member are from Colombia. The Colombian mining company 
hires the Colombian organization in the United States, where they plan 
the torture. The Colombian organization then commits the torture in 
Colombia. 
Under the first hypothetical, some conduct takes places in the United 
States, while some conduct takes place abroad. The defendant hires the 
torturer in the United States, plans the torture in the United States, but 
executes the torture in Colombia. Under the first Kiobel inquiry, would 
hiring a torturer and planning with a torturer constitute “relevant 
conduct”? Assuming it does, the criminal organization still executed the 
torture outside of the United States. Is it enough that some of the 
“relevant conduct” takes place inside the United States, while the main 
conduct takes place abroad? How much relevant conduct needs to take 
place in the United States for ATS jurisdiction? 
In the second hypothetical, the mining company and the organization 
are from the United States, while the union member is from Colombia. 
The United States mining company hires the United States organization 





125 Roger P. Alford, The Future of Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1749, 1754 (2014) (“The Kiobel decision is complex and confusing, 
offering scant guidance as to how lower courts should proceed when claims touch and 
concern U.S. territory.”). 
126 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:111 
 
in Colombia, where they plan the torture. The United States organization 
then tortures the Colombian union member in Colombia. 
In the second hypothetical, all of the relevant conduct, including the 
hiring, the planning, and the torture takes place abroad, putting an end to 
the first inquiry. The defendant is a United States company that hired a 
United States criminal organization to torture a Colombian citizen. Does 
the fact that the defendant is a United States company, coupled with the 
fact that it hired a criminal organization from the United States, touch 
and concern the territory of the United States with sufficient force? What 
if the criminal organization was from Colombia and only the defendant 
was from the United States? Would that claim sufficiently touch and 
concern the United States? What if the union member was part of a 
United States labor union? Would that be enough force to displace the 
presumption? 
Many of these questions regarding the operation of the two Kiobel 
inquiries are questions that the lower courts have attempted to answer. 
The following section will illustrate how the lower courts have dealt with 
some of these ambiguities. 
There are a several types of United States contacts that can 
potentially render a claim domestic, and not extraterritorial, for purposes 
of the presumption against territoriality. These include: (1) the execution 
of a violation in the United States; (2) the planning of a violation in the 
United States; (3) the effects of a violation in the United States; and (4) 
the United States citizenship of a party to the violation. On one end, if 
the execution of a violation takes place in the United States, the claim is 
clearly domestic and the presumption will be no obstacle to jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, if the execution of the violation takes place outside of 
the United States, but a party to the claim is a United States citizen, or 
the effects of the claim are felt in the United States, the claim may be 
considered extraterritorial and barred under the presumption. Similarly, if 
the execution of a federal law violation occurs outside of the United 
States, but the planning of the execution of the violation takes place in 
the United States, it is unclear whether the claim is domestic or 
extraterritorial for the purposes of the presumption. 
The Kiobel test looks to the location of “relevant conduct” to 
determine whether a claim is extraterritorial. This forecloses the 
possibility of finding a claim to be domestic when there exists simply 
United States effects or a United States citizen is a party to the claim, 
without there being United States conduct. Thus, under Kiobel a claim is 
only extraterritorial if it contains effects in the United States or if a 
United States citizen is involved. At this point, the presumption may only 
be overcome if the claim touches and concerns the United States territory 
with sufficient force. 
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A. Relationship Between the Two Kiobel Clauses 
1. When to Proceed 
Lower court decisions disagree as to when courts should proceed to 
the second Kiobel inquiry. The Second Circuit held that if none of the 
relevant conduct takes place within the United States, the court need not 
proceed to the second inquiry; the presumption against extraterritoriality, 
which is not easily overcome, bars plaintiff’s ATS claim.126 By this 
account, the only time the second inquiry would be triggered is if it is not 
the case that all the relevant conduct took place abroad. Only in such an 
instance would the second question be triggered, in which the courts 
would employ a “fact-based” inquiry to see if the claims “touch and 
concern” the United States with “sufficient force” to displace the 
presumption.127 
The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, determined that the two 
inquiries are always relevant.128 It held that even if all the relevant 
conduct takes place abroad, the court should still consider the inquiry 
contemplated in the second part of the Kiobel test.129 Thus, even if all 
relevant conduct took place abroad, the court needs to ask whether the 
“claims” of the plaintiff, “including the parties’ identities and their 
relationship to the causes of action,” touch and concern the United States 
with enough force to displace the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.130 
There is reason to view the Fourth Circuit’s approach as the better 
one. If the Second Circuit’s approach were correct, there would have 
been no need for the Supreme Court to articulate part two of its test, 
based on the facts of Kiobel. In Kiobel, the Court said all the relevant 
conduct occurred abroad. If that were the end of the matter, it would be 
dictum for the Kiobel Court to have articulated circumstances under the 
second inquiry that would displace the presumption.131 Admittedly, the 
                                                                                                             
126 Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that Kiobel bars 
the plaintiffs’ claims because the plaintiffs did not allege “any relevant conduct that 
occurred within the United States.”). 
127 See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 528 (4th Cir. 2014). 
128 See id. 
129 Id. at 528 (“However, the clear implication of the Court’s ‘touch and concern’ 
language is that courts should not assume that the presumption categorically bars cases 
that manifest a close connection to the United States territory.”). 
130 Id. at 527. 
131 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
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Courts do occasionally give guidance to lower courts beyond the facts of 
the case.132 
The disagreement, between the Second and the Fourth Circuits, is 
important for corporate liability. If the Second Circuit approach is 
correct, then ATS actions for human rights violations that take place 
abroad will be barred even if the defendant is an American multinational, 
so long as all the “relevant conduct” (whatever that may be) took place 
abroad. If the Fourth Circuit is correct, on the other hand, there might be 
room for arguing that the claims touch and concern the territory of the 
United States on account of the defendant corporation’s United States 
nationality. 
2. Conflation of the Clauses 
The Second Circuit partially conflated parts one and two of the 
Kiobel test.133 In Mastafa, the Second Circuit declared that in deciding 
whether the presumption against extraterritoriality bars a plaintiff’s 
claim, “the first step is to determine whether the ‘relevant’ conduct . . . 
sufficiently ‘touches and concerns’ the territory of the United 
States . . . .”134 In Al Shimari, the Fourth Circuit identically declared that 
“the presumption against extraterritorial application bars the exercise of 
subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ ATS claims unless the 
‘relevant conduct’ . . . ‘touch[es] and concern[s]’ the territory of the 
United States with sufficient force . . . .”135 
Part two of the Kiobel test asks whether the “claims”—not the 
“relevant conduct”—touch and concern the United States.136 In Al 
Shimari, the Fourth Circuit explained this distinction: “We also note that 
the Court broadly stated that the ‘claims,’ rather than the ‘alleged tortious 
conduct,’ must touch and concern United States territory with sufficient 
force.”137 The court then defined “claim” as the “aggregate of operative 
                                                                                                             
132 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (finding that the 
mentally ill and felons are still forbidden from using guns, even though the mentally ill or 
felons were not involved in the case). 
133 Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 186 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that the first 
step is to determine whether the relevant conduct sufficiently touches and concerns the 
territory of the United States); Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 527 (holding that “relevant 
conduct” frames the touch and concern inquiry). 
134 Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 186. 
135 Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 528. 
136 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669; Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 618 (9th Cir. 
2014) (Zilly, J., concurring) (“In concluding that . . . plaintiffs must allege some 
‘conduct’ within our borders, the majority misconstrues Kiobel’s ‘touch and concern’ 
test, which is focused on the connection between the ATS ‘claims’ and the United 
States.”). 
137 Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 527. 
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facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court,”138 and added that 
“claim” should include the parties’ identities and their relationship to the 
causes of action.139 By this reading, circumstances that can displace the 
presumption against extraterritoriality are broader than the defendant’s 
“relevant conduct.”140 While “relevant conduct” is certainly one 
component of a plaintiff’s “claim,” (the aggregate of operative facts 
giving rise to an enforceable right) to be considered under the second 
inquiry, so is the defendant’s status as a United States corporation, which 
does not fit into the narrower category of the defendant’s “conduct.”141 
The plain language of Kiobel corresponds with the Fourth Circuit’s 
approach that it is the “claims” that should touch and concern the United 
States, not just the “relevant conduct.”142 Properly understood, Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence offers factors that can make up those “claims.”143 
Breyer would find jurisdiction over an ATS claim where: (1) the alleged 
tort occurred on American Soil, (2) the defendant is an American 
national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely 
affects an important American national interest.144 Under Breyer’s test, 
the fact that the defendant is an American national, or that the 
defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an important 
American interest, can make up the components of a claim that “touch 
and concern the United States [ ]with sufficient force . . . .”145 
B. Kiobel Part One: “Relevant Conduct” 
1. Restrictive Reading of “Relevant Conduct” 
Under the first Kiobel inquiry, if a claim involves conduct that 
occurs both domestically and abroad, the “relevant” conduct must occur 
in the United States.146 Otherwise, a plaintiff will be required to show, 
under part two, that the claim touches and concerns the United States 
with enough force in order to overcome the presumption.147 
                                                                                                             
138 Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 281 (9th ed. 2009)). 
139 Id. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. 
142 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
143 Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
144 Id. 
145 See id. 
146 See id. 
147 Id. 
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The lower courts have narrowly interpreted “relevant conduct” from 
the first Kiobel inquiry.148 Cardona, an Eleventh Circuit case, is 
illustrative of the lower courts’ narrow interpretation.149 In that case, 
four-thousand Colombians brought suit against Chiquita, Inc., a United 
States corporation, for violating the ATS.150 They alleged that Chiquita 
participated “in a campaign of torture and murder in Colombia by 
reviewing, approving, and concealing a scheme of payments and 
weapons shipments to Colombian terrorist organizations, all from their 
corporate offices in [New Jersey].”151 The plaintiffs’ claimed that 
terrorists used these weapons to commit war crimes.152 Upon review, the 
Eleventh Circuit decided that the presumption against extraterritorially 
defeated jurisdiction because all the tortious conduct took place outside 
of the United States.153 
The court’s holding reflects its position that under part one of Kiobel, 
relevant conduct is conduct that constitutes a violation of the law of 
nations under Sosa.154 While the scope of “relevant conduct” under part 
one is unclear, it seems that if the Kiobel majority wanted only the 
location of defendant’s international law violation to determine whether 
the presumption against extraterritoriality barred a claim, it would have 
avoided using a term as general as “relevant conduct,” which seems to 
encompass more.155 
The Cardona court ultimately found that approving weapon 
shipments to terrorist organizations did not qualify as a violation of the 
law of nations under Sosa.156 As a result, plaintiffs’ claims were subject 
to part two of the Kiobel test.157 Under part two, the court, like the 
                                                                                                             
148 See Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 193 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the 
presumption bars claims where subsidiary companies facilitate an apartheid regime from 
U.S.); see also Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530 (4th Cir. 
2014) (holding that the presumption bars claims where a subsidiary of a Delaware 
corporation hire interrogators that participate in conduct that violates Geneva 
convention). 
149 Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014). 
150 Id. at 1188. 
151 Id. at 1192 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
152 Id. at 1194 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
153 Id. at 1189 (noting that any tort in the case was committed outside of the United 
States). 
154 See id. The Second and Ninth Circuits have similarly limited relevant conduct to 
tortious conduct. See Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 182 (holding that the 
presumption bars the claim because all of the violations of international law occurred 
abroad); see also Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 69 F. Supp. 3d 75, 96 (D.C. 2014) 
(holding that ATS claims can go forward if some actionable conduct occurred in the 
United States). 
155 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
156 Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1189. 
157 Id. 
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Second circuit, misconstrued the Kiobel inquiry and decided that “[no] 
act constituting a tort in terms of the ATS touched and concerned the 
territory of the United States with any force.”158 
2. Overactive Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
As a result of the lower courts’ restrictive interpretation of “relevant 
conduct,” plaintiffs must establish that the defendant committed an 
international law violation on American soil.159 This creates a high 
barrier to ATS jurisdiction. 
To illustrate this point, imagine that Royal Dutch Petroleum 
provided financial assistance from the United States to an oppressive 
South African governmental regime that tortured and killed its citizens in 
exchange for access to South African petroleum reservoirs. In many 
jurisdictions, in order to prove that Royal Dutch Petroleum aided and 
abetted the regime (committed an international law violation), plaintiffs 
would have to show that Royal Dutch Petroleum provided financial 
assistance with the purpose of furthering the regime. If Royal Dutch 
Petroleum provided financial assistance only to gain access to petroleum, 
the corporation did not act with the purpose of furthering the regime, and 
did not aid and abet the government. And if plaintiffs were in a 
jurisdiction that proceeded to the second inquiry, they would have to 
plead that their claim touches and concerns the territory of the United 
States. If not, their claim would be barred by the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. 
The jurisdictional threshold is lower in other statutory contexts. For 
section 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, if an investor 
purchases or sells securities on a United States stock exchange, the 
presumption against extraterritoriality would not bar the investor’s claim, 
even where other conduct required for establishing the 10b-5 violations 
occurs abroad.160 Although, the plaintiff does need to show that the entire 
violation occurred within the United States, as is the case within the 
context of the ATS.161 For example, a company could defraud investors 
                                                                                                             
158 Id. It is the “claims” that should touch and concern the territory of the United States, 
which is broader than requiring a tort to touch and concern. See Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 
771 F.3d 580, 618 (9th Cir. 2014) (Zilly, J., concurring). 
159 See, e.g., Doe I, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 96 (holding that an ATS claim can go forward if 
some actionable conduct occurred in the United States). 
160 See Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 270-71 (2010). Under 
Morrison, as long as the purchase or sale of the security occurs in the United States, the 
Court has jurisdiction to hear the claim. Id. This is so even if the fraudulent conduct in 
connection with the purchase or sale of the security, such as releasing misleading 
statements, occurs outside of the United States. See id. 
161 See id. at 267-68. 
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by reporting misleading figures about a company’s financial health in 
Australia. As long as the securities were purchased or sold on an 
American stock exchange, the presumption against extraterritoriality 
would not bar a plaintiff’s suit under section 10b-5 of the Securities and 
Exchange Act. 
Similarly, the Court in Continental Ore Co. did not require plaintiffs 
to plead that a violation of the anti-trust laws occurred within the United 
States to attain jurisdiction.162 In Continental Ore Co., defendant 
corporations were accused of monopolizing the trade of vanadium 
products by selling them in Canada.163 Despite the foreign location of 
defendant’s conduct, the Court had jurisdiction to hear the claim.164 The 
Court reasoned that the presumption against extraterritoriality did not 
apply because the sale of Vanadium products in Canada impacted trade 
within the United States.165 Plaintiffs did not have to allege that every 
element, required to constitute violation of the law, occurred in the 
United States, as they do under the ATS.166 
The presumption against extraterritoriality is less aggressive in 
connection with 10b-5 and the antitrust laws. However, for a plaintiff to 
avoid triggering the presumption against extraterritoriality under the 
ATS, he must establish that the defendant, on American soil, violated 
international law—not merely an element of that law. 
C. Kiobel Part Two: Displacing the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality 
1. Meaning of “Touch and Concern the Territory of the 
United States” 
The second Kiobel inquiry uses language that has proven to be 
ineffective within the context of covenants and servitudes. “Touch and 
concern” originates from an old English decision concerning the law of 
covenants called Spencer’s Case.167 Spencer’s Case held that for 
covenants to survive the transfer of land, they must “touch and concern” 
                                                                                                             
162 See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 
(1962) (“A conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of the 
United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because part of the conduct 
complained of occurs in foreign countries.”). 
163 Id. at 692-93. 
164 See id. at 710. 
165 See id. at 706. 
166 See id. at 704. 
167 Spencer’s Case, 5 Co. Rep. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 1583). 
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the land they run with.168 For hundreds of years, courts and 
commentators have struggled defining the meaning of “touch and 
concern.”169 One court declared, “in truth, such a description or test . . . is 
too vague to be of much assistance.”170 In 1988, the American Law 
Institute removed the “touch and concern” language in the Restatement 
(Third) of Property: Servitudes.171 
It is difficult to decipher what “touch and concern” means in relation 
to United States territory under Kiobel. On a basic level, touch means “to 
relate to” or “to have an influence on,”172 and concern similarly means 
“to relate to” or “to affect or involve.”173 
Whether a claim touches and concerns the territory of the United 
States could turn on how a court defines “touch” and “concern.”174 To 
illustrate this point, imagine that certain Nigerian plaintiffs brought an 
ATS action against a Nigerian corporation for using Nigerian slaves. 
Imagine also that the slaves worked in a factory in Nigeria. It can be said 
that this ATS claim relates to the United States, because the Nigerian 
corporation engages in a practice that the United States is committed to 
ending. But because the suit involves foreigners working in foreign 
factories, the suit does not involve the United States. If this hypothetical 
court interpreted “touch and concern” to mean “involve,” the plaintiffs 
could not bring their ATS claim.  
It is also unclear what the Kiobel Court meant by “the territory of the 
United States.”175 Literally, territory of the United States could mean its 
physical territory. By this interpretation, plaintiffs’ claims must touch 
and concern something that exists within the physical boundaries of the 
United States. For example, if ExxonMobil violated international law 
when it procured oil in Iran, and that oil was shipped into the physical 
territory of the United States, the claim “touched” the territory of the 
United States. Alternatively, touching and concerning United States 
territory could mean touching and concerning important interests of the 
United States. This approach would mirror the second prong of Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence in Kiobel, in which he would find ATS jurisdiction 
where “the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an 
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important American national interest.”176 Under this interests approach to 
interpreting the United States territory, even if ExxonMobil never 
transported oil into the physical territory of the United States, it could 
still touch and concern American interests if the lawful procurement of 
oil is sufficiently important to the United States. Because the Kiobel 
majority did not adopt Breyer’s test, it is unlikely, however, that they 
would find the presumption displaced when claims merely touch and 
concern American interests.177 
A court’s interpretation of “touch and concern” and “territory of the 
United States” does not guarantee a particular result in any case. 
Ultimately, an ATS claim must “touch and concern” with “sufficient 
force.”178 Even if a court uses the broader “relate to” definition of “touch 
and concern,” which could seemingly be satisfied by any set of facts, the 
Kiobel test allows the court to determine to what extent such claims 
would need to “relate to” the territory of the United States with the 
“sufficient force” requirement. The only guidance given by the Court as 
to how much “force” is required to displace the presumption is that the 
facts of Kiobel were insufficient.179 Beyond that, courts are free to 
decide. 
2. Corporate Citizenship Insufficient to Displace the 
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
Kiobel offered the lower courts little guidance in determining, under 
part two of its test, what circumstances would have enough force to 
displace the presumption against extraterritoriality.180 If, for example, 
ExxonMobil were to aid and abet war crimes in Ecuador, it is unclear 
what circumstances would allow a United States court to hear ATS 
claims against ExxonMobil. 
The lower courts disagree about whether a defendant’s status as a 
United States corporation can displace the presumption when the claim 
involves conduct that occurred on foreign territory. The Ninth and 
Eleventh Circuits held that a defendant’s status as a United States 
corporation alone is insufficient to allow jurisdiction in such 
situations,181 whereas the Fourth Circuit held that a corporation’s United 
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States citizenship is one factor that weighs in favor of jurisdiction.182 The 
Fourth Circuit did not clarify whether United States citizenship was 
alone sufficient to displace the presumption.183 The Second Circuit has 
taken the position that a defendant’s status as a United States corporation 
is irrelevant under Kiobel and has no force in displacing the presumption 
when the “relevant conduct” takes place outside of the United States.184 
Under the Second Circuit’s ruling, then, the fact that ExxonMobil is a 
United States corporation would not help victims of the war crimes, 
committed in Ecuador, bring an ATS action. 
This decision to render insignificant a defendant-corporation’s status 
as a United States corporation is flawed. The Second Circuit argued that 
because Kiobel ruled that “mere corporate presence” was insufficient to 
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, United States 
corporate citizenship too must be insufficient.185 But Kiobel, in finding 
that “mere corporate presence” was insufficient, seemingly addressed the 
facts of Kiobel, where the defendants were Nigerian and Dutch 
corporations.186 The Court did not rule on the question of United States 
corporate citizenship, because the Kiobel defendants were not United 
States corporations.187 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s holding was 
intentionally incomplete.188 The status of United States corporations 
involve a stronger connection to the United States than a foreign 
corporation having presence in the United States. To treat citizenship and 
presence the same ignores this fact. 
The Second Circuit further justified its marginalization of United 
States corporate citizenship by citing Aramco.189 In that case, a United 
States citizen claimed that his United States corporate employer, Arabian 
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American Oil Company, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.190 
The plaintiff alleged that Arabian American Oil Company’s subsidiary 
transferred plaintiff from Houston to Saudi Arabia, where he was 
discriminated against on account of his race, religion, and national 
origin.191 Despite the fact that Arabian American Oil Company was a 
United States corporation, Aramco held that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality barred plaintiff’s claim, which involved discrimination 
in Saudi Arabia.192 
Even though a defendant’s United States nationality does not rebut 
the presumption against extraterritoriality within the context of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act, it does not mean that a defendant’s United States 
nationality will not, within the context of the ATS.193 In connection with 
the ATS, a defendant’s United States citizenship is of particular 
concern—“the sovereign who refuses to cause a reparation to be made 
for the damages caused by his subject, or to punish the offender, or 
finally, to deliver him up, renders himself in some measure an 
accomplice in the injury, and becomes responsible for it.”194 
Furthermore, “[i]n focusing on the ATS ‘claims,’ and not the underlying 
‘conduct,’ the Kiobel Court carefully left open the door through which 
foreign victims of heinous acts by United States nationals could hold 
such individuals or corporate entities accountable.”195 
D. Irreconcilable Application of the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality 
If a claim involves conduct that occurred on foreign territory, courts 
may still exercise jurisdiction if the claim has a sufficiently strong 
connection to the United States.196 The stronger the domestic contacts of 
a claim, the less likely it is that the claim should be excluded by the 
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presumption.197 A comparison of Mastafa and Sexual Minorities Uganda 
demonstrates how the Kiobel test has not always produced such 
congruent applications of the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
In Mastafa, plaintiffs claimed that Chevron, a United States 
corporation, aided and abetted the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq.198 
Plaintiffs were Iraqi women who were tortured by agents of the 
regime.199 They alleged that Chevron aided and abetted the regime by 
purchasing oil in the United States from Iraq, and that funding from the 
purchase financed the human rights abuses.200 Employing a “purpose” 
aiding and abetting standard,201 the court found that Chevron did not 
purchase oil with the purpose of aiding the Saddam Hussein regime.202 
Accordingly, it found that no international law violation occurred in the 
United States, and that the claim was subject to, and barred by, the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.203 
In Sexual Minorities Uganda, an American citizen allegedly assisted 
and encouraged the denial of fundamental rights to the lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) people in Uganda from the 
United States.204 As in Mastafa, the Sexual Minorities Uganda court 
employed a purpose aiding and abetting liability standard. Because the 
plaintiff, Sexual Minorities Uganda, an LGBTI organization, pleaded 
that the American citizen acted with the purpose of aiding and abetting 
the persecution of sexual minorities, plaintiff’s suit was not subject to the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, and the court could hear the 
merits.205 
Circumstances that establish an international law violation in one set 
of facts and not in another do not necessarily reflect an increase in 
contacts with the United States.206 A comparison of the United States’ 
conduct in Mastafa and Sexual Minorities Uganda illustrate this point. In 
Mastafa, plaintiffs’ alleged that “Chevron financed the sale of two 
million barrels of oil . . . for which Chevron ‘facilitated’ ‘a surcharge 
payment of nearly half a million dollars be paid to the [Saddam Hussein] 
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regime.”207 In Sexual Minorities Uganda, one citizen assisted an 
organization by formulating strategies to discriminate and persecute 
LBGTI communities.208 The magnitude of Chevron’s transaction, from 
which profits were recouped in the United States, necessarily involved 
more contacts with the United States than the citizen’s assistance to 
persecute LBGTI communities. Chevron is a large United States 
corporation and many of the decisions with regard to the transaction 
must have been made “by [its] top stake holders.”209 Other Chevron 
employees, who were not themselves responsible for the decision, 
participated in facilitating the transaction.210 This amount of people, in 
combination with the size of the transaction that lead to the regime 
payments, involved more of a connection with the United States than in 
Sexual Minorities Uganda—where one man assisted an organization to 
persecute sexual minorities. Yet, the latter meets the criteria for a 
violation of the laws of nations by meeting the elements of aiding and 
abetting liability, while Chevron’s transaction does not. The result is that 
a transaction with enormous domestic contacts is barred by the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, and the other, which in 
comparison involves almost none, is not.211 
V. RETHINKING KIOBEL 
A. The Morrison “Focus” Test 
In Morrison, Justice Scalia emphasized that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality changes based on the context of its application.212 
Morrison dealt with Australian investors who alleged that National 
Australia Bank committed securities fraud.213 According to the 
complaint, National Australia Bank’s mortgage servicing company, 
Homeslide Lending, manipulated certain financial models in Florida to 
make its shares appear more valuable.214 Thereafter, Australian investors 
purchased National Australia Bank’s fraudulently inflated shares on the 
Australian Stock exchange.215 
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Plaintiffs argued that because Florida was where the defendant 
manipulated its financial models, the defendant’s conduct was not 
“extraterritorial,” and the presumption against extraterritoriality did not 
deny the application of 10(b) to their claim.216 The Supreme Court, 
however, declared that the location of purchases and sales of securities—
not the location where the deception originated—governed the 
application of the presumption to plaintiffs’ 10(b) claims.217 In coming to 
its decision, the court cited Aramco.218 In Aramco, the Court concluded 
that it was the location of employment, which was the focus of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that determined whether plaintiffs could 
bring their claim.219 
The Morrison court, in quoting Aramco, adopted a “focus” test, 
which looks to the “objects of the statute’s solicitude” to determine what 
kind of United States contacts can allow a claim to proceed despite the 
fact that some conduct took place on foreign soil.220 Justice Scalia, 
applying the test, determined that the focus of section 10(b) is to punish 
deceptive conduct only “in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security registered on a national securities exchange.”221 Because the 
actual security transaction in Morrison took place outside of the United 
States, Scalia ruled that the presumption barred plaintiffs’ claim.222 
B. Morrison Meets Kiobel 
It is unclear whether Kiobel adopted Morrison’s “focus” test. In Doe, 
a Ninth Circuit ATS case, the majority and concurrence disagreed on this 
matter.223 The majority decided that Kiobel’s “touch and concern” 
language replaced “focus” within the context of the ATS.224 However, 
“touch and concern” is not mutually exclusive with “focus.” “Touch and 
concern” addresses whether “claims” can displace the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.225 “Focus” determines what types of United 
States contacts are necessary to displace the presumption.226 The “focus” 
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test is narrower in that it looks to a specific type of contact.227 “Touch 
and concern” looks to an entire claim.228 Morrison can be read as 
providing substance to the Kiobel test. By this interpretation, the factors 
that “touch and concern the United States” with sufficient force are those 
that reflect the “focus” of the federal law at issue.229 
Kiobel can be seen as incorporating Morrison’s focus test. Under 
Morrison, a federal statute’s “focus” should determine the types of 
United States contacts that are necessary for a claim to proceed when the 
claim involves conduct that took place on foreign soil.230 After Sosa, 
aside from the violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of 
ambassadors and piracy, only “judge-inferred” causes of action can 
provide plaintiffs the basis for an ATS claim.231 These causes of action, 
according to Justice Alito, are the ATS’s “focus.”232 Because the Kiobel 
test, as interpreted by some of the lower courts, looks to whether these 
causes of action (the torts), took place in the United States, Kiobel may 
have silently incorporated a Morrison focus standard. 
However, the ATS can also be seen as having a different focus. The 
focus of the ATS might be those motivating factors that encouraged 
Congress to enact the ATS in the first place.233 This reading would look 
to a number of possible motivations for the ATS’s enactment, including: 
(1) complying with the law of nations to prevent international conflict,234 
and (2) complying with the law of nations to become a fully functioning 
member of the international community.235 
The ATS’s focus can also be the focus of individual international law 
violations. Justice Alito declared that the ATS’s focus is international 
law causes of action.236 Instead of treating these violations as the 
“focus,” the courts could look to the focus of each individual violation to 
determine what United States contacts are required for jurisdiction. In 
other words, courts would analyze the “focus of the focus.” For example, 
treating a 10b-5 violation as the “focus” is different than treating the 
purchase and sale of securities, the focus of 10b-5, as the focus. 
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Morrison and subsequent case law offer support to this position, because 
those cases analyze particular statutory schemes.237 When the focus of a 
statute is another statute, it could be said that that both schemes require 
analysis. 
C. The “Focus” of the ATS 
Based on Justice Alito’s determination about the “focus” of the ATS, 
Kiobel may have properly incorporated the “focus test.”238 However, 
courts and judges do not always agree on what the focus of a statute is.239 
Additionally, some courts have acknowledged that under Morrison, a 
statute may have multiple focuses.240 Below are two alternative 
applications of Morrison to the ATS. The first is the congressional 
motivation approach, and the second is the “focus of the focus” 
approach. 
1. Congressional Motivation 
The “focus” of the ATS might be the purpose behind its enactment. 
If that purpose was to remedy torts, which, if left unattended, could 
threaten the United States’ standing with other nations,241 such torts 
would provide ATS jurisdiction. If that purpose was to become a fully 
functioning member of the international community,242 addressing torts, 
which, if acted upon, demonstrated the United States’ commitment to the 
international community, would provide ATS jurisdiction. Such a 
“focus” would direct courts to play a role in the international legal order 
and exercise universal jurisdiction as courts of international law. 
2. Focus of the Focus 
If the “focus” test is applied in a way that requires analysis of 
individual violations of international law, the test would produce 
different focuses depending on the violation at issue.243 Accordingly, 
different types of United States contacts would dictate whether courts 
have ATS jurisdiction in claims that are based, in part, on conduct that 
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took place on foreign soil.244 Below is an illustration of how crimes 
against humanity, a cause of action for ATS claims, would function 
under a “focus of the focus” analysis. 
In order to plead a crime against humanity, the plaintiff must allege a 
“denial of fundamental rights,” as well as “the intentional targeting of an 
identifiable group.”245 The attack must be “pursuant to or in furtherance 
of a State or organizational policy to commit such an attack.”246 Kiobel, 
as interpreted by some of the lower courts, requires ATS plaintiffs to 
allege that the international law violation took place in the United States 
in order to proceed with their claims that involve foreign conduct.247 As 
illustrated by Mujica below, simply looking to the location where 
defendant committed the crime against humanity under Kiobel may not 
administer the presumption against extraterritoriality in a way that 
captures the “focus” of a crime against humanity—which appears to 
include committing the crimes to further some policy.248 
Under a “focus of the focus” analysis, Courts would need to conduct 
an analysis of the crimes against humanity statute. Crimes against 
humanity, under the statute, are widespread attacks on a targeted group 
to further some policy.249 If the attack is not executed “pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such an attack,” 
it would not constitute a crime against humanity.250 The random 
extermination of a group of civilians, without direction, is not a crime 
against humanity.251 Because the “policy” component of a crime against 
humanity is essential, there is good reason to include it in the violation’s 
“focus” under the “focus of the focus” test. 
Mujica illustrates that under Morrison, different focus 
determinations produce different jurisdictional results. In Mujica, the 
Ninth Circuit held that two United States corporations—Occidental 
Petroleum Corp. and AirScan, Inc.—could not be held liable under the 
ATS, in part, because the alleged crimes against humanity occurred 
outside of the United States.252 There, plaintiffs, civilians from Santo 
Domingo, pleaded that Occidental Petroleum jointly owned an oil 
production facility and pipeline in Santo Domingo with the Colombian 
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Government.253 AirScan was employed by Occidental Petroleum to 
protect the facility and pipeline from “left-wing insurgents.”254 In order 
to secure the pipeline, the Colombian military carried out a raid in Santo 
Domingo.255 The military received assistance from Occidental Petroleum 
and AirScan.256 Occidental provided the military with a room to plan the 
raid, and AirScan piloted planes, paid for by Occidental Petroleum, in 
order to identify targets in Santo Domingo and determine where to 
deploy troops.257 The Colombian Air Force, with the assistance of the 
United States corporations, dropped cluster bombs on a town in Santo 
Domingo.258 Afterwards, the Colombian military entered the town and 
ransacked its homes.259 The explosions destroyed homes, killed 
seventeen civilians, and injured twenty-five.260 The Ninth Circuit decided 
that because the alleged crime against humanity took place in Santo 
Domingo, and not in the United States, the claim was barred on 
extraterritoriality grounds.261 Additionally, the court declared that the 
only connection the defendants had to the United States was their status 
as Untied States corporations, and that, in itself, was not enough to 
displace the presumption.262 
Mujica would have possibly turned out differently if the courts, 
operating under a “focus of the focus” test, decided that the focus of a 
crime against humanity is “an attack pursuant to a State or organizational 
policy.” If the court decided so, United States contacts relevant to 
assessing ATS jurisdiction would include those contacts that are related 
to the motivating policy behind the attack. In Mujica, the policy behind 
the attack was financial—protecting a valuable asset.263 Occidental 
Petroleum, located in Los Angeles, and AirScan, located in Florida, 
assisted the Colombian government to reap financial benefits, which 
resulted from the protection of a significant asset in Santo Domingo.264 
The financial benefit gained from the defendants’ involvement in the raid 
would primarily flow to the corporations’ headquarters in Los Angeles 
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and Florida.265 Here, under a “focus of the focus” test, courts would 
consider contacts related to the underlying policy of the attack and find 
that those financial contacts flowed to recipients in the United States—
specifically to Los Angeles and Florida corporations.266 Accordingly, the 
contacts that would matter for the presumption would not be 
“extraterritorial,” and plaintiffs would be able to proceed with their 
claim. 
3. The Most Sensible “Focus” to Apply 
It is unclear which “focus” of the ATS would provide for the best 
results. Indeed, the courts have pointed out that it is not always clear how 
Morrison’s logic translates to other statutory schemes.267 
It may be most sensible for the “focus” of the ATS to be 
international law violations. If this were the case, the Kiobel test would 
stay the same, as the location where the international law violation was 
committed would govern whether courts have ATS jurisdiction. 
The “congressional motivation” approach presents difficulties. If the 
purpose of the ATS is to prevent international conflict, and courts had to 
determine which ATS claims pose such conflicts, judges would be forced 
to enter into “a delicate field of international relations,” which Congress 
“alone has the facilities necessary to make fairly such an important 
policy decision . . . .”268 Forcing judges to make decisions about which 
claims provoke international conflict would potentially conflict with the 
presumption against extraterritoriality’s purpose to prevent “unintended 
clashes between our laws and the laws of other nations which could 
result in international discord.”269 
If the “focus” of the ATS is for the United States to become a fully 
functioning member of the international community, judges would 
inappropriately determine the extent of the United States’ international 
involvement, against the separation of powers doctrine.270 Moreover, 
judges are not equipped to decide the effects that a course of action will 
have on the United States’ standing with the international community.271 
The “focus of the focus” test also presents difficulties. Investigating 
the “focus” of each ATS cause of action would create confusion among 
the circuits, as judges would inevitably disagree as to what each 
                                                                                                             
265 See id. 
266 See id. 
267 U.S. v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing In re Toyota Motor 
Corp., 785 F. Sup. 2d 883, 914 (C.D. Cal. 2011)). 
268 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013). 
269 Id. at 1661. 
270 See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 531 (4th Cir. 2014). 
271 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664. 
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particular violation’s focus is. Indeed, in Morrison itself, the majority 
and concurrence disagreed as to the “focus” of section 10b-5 of the 
Securities and Exchange Act.272 Each international law under the ATS 
would create the potential for the same kind of disagreement, and the 
United States courts would inconsistently apply the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. 
Moreover, not all international law violations have a unified 
statutory scheme. For instance, with regards to crimes against humanity, 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (RSICC) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) are 
broader than the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR).273 
The ICTR defines crimes against humanity as “a widespread or 
systematic attack . . . on national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious 
grounds.”274 The RSICC and the ICTY allow prosecution for crimes 
against humanity when they are directed at “any civilian population.”275 
When determining what the focus of an international law violation is 
under a “focus of the focus” approach, it would be difficult to decide 
which international statute to use, especially when the different statutes 
would lead judges to infer different focuses. 
At the same time, because the ATS derives substantive significance 
from various international law violations, it may be ill-suited for a 
singular test, like Kiobel, that treats all violations the same.276 Moreover, 
if international law violations are not individually examined, the ATS’s 
“jurisdictional reach” will not always match its “underlying substantive 
grasp.”277 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Kiobel test presents many issues. The lower courts, for example, 
have provided conflicting and questionable applications of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. The two Kiobel inquiries, as a 
result of their ambiguity, give lower courts the flexibility to use the 
                                                                                                             
272 Compare Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (holding that 
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presumption against extraterritoriality to deny claims brought against 
MNCs choosing to operate their businesses to the detriment of foreign 
nationals. This is troubling, especially in cases like Mastafa,278 where a 
court can decide that the conduct of a United States corporation does not 
touch and concern territory of the United States with enough force. It is 
important that the Supreme Court provide more guidance on how to 
administer the presumption against extraterritoriality within the context 
of the ATS. This guidance should include an explanation of how 
Morrison’s “focus” test will function in ATS cases. 
                                                                                                             
278 See Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 189 (2d Cir. 2014). 
